W hen I left the academic world to become a legal director in the Ontario Ministry of Health, my first responsibility was to provide advice to the then 11 government mental hospitals. The Mental Hospitals Act contained a regulation that permitted the disclosure of patient information so long as the disclosure was clearly not against the best interests of the patient. At that time, information was routinely shared about patients where healthcare professionals saw the need for continuity of care. Sort of like today's "circle-of-care" concept, although disclosures in those days included police and insurers.
Almost 35 years ago, following the revelation of improper disclosure of patient information, Horace Krever was asked to head up a Royal Commission review into confidentiality of health information. One of his major recommendations was that patients should be provided with a right of access to their records. There were severe repercussions from the medical and hospital community. The government put that issue out for consultation and did not implement any of Krever's recommendations at that time. When the Mental Health Act came up for amending, the access rights by patients issue was provided for in that legislation, notwithstanding examples by critics of the sky falling in should patients be able to review their charts, particularly regarding information provided by family and friends. Review mechanisms were established and appeals could be made to tribunals on matters of mental competency and whether information should be protected from disclosure to patients. However, the principal was now embodied in legislation.
A bizarre situation in the privacy arena arose a few years later. When the federal government's new privacy rules were introduced into parliament, they claimed that they did not apply to healthcare, although a plain reading suggested that they did. A number of us appeared before the parliamentary committee examining this legislation and we were again told that the provisions did not apply. Those who work in this field now know otherwise.
Regarding consent to treatment, I recall visiting the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre in the 1970s and asking its then medical superintendent under the Mental Hospitals Act whether he ever treated patients against their will. His response was that he would never do that; however, his definition of whether patients had the mental capacity to consent or refuse treatment was whether they agreed with the proposed treatment. His reasoning was that, if they did not, then they clearly lacked capacity and judgement to understand what was best for them. In those circumstances, treatment proceeded regardless of whether a relative was available to make the substitute decision because it was deemed in patients' best interests. About the same time, a case was proceeding through the Ontario Courts called Reibl vs. Hughes. It ultimately turned on the matter of consent. Mr. Justice Bora Laskin wrote the majority decision in the Supreme Court of Canada. To find a way to compensate the patient, he took one element of consent (the requirement that it be informed), out of the traditional context whereby consent provided a defense to an allegation of battery and wrapped American legal doctrine around it to establish a new principle in Canadian law; that aspect of consent was moved from the battery side of the torts ledger and given negligence language. So along with the duty of physicians to provide care that accorded with the standard of practice, there became another element of that duty, which involved disclosure of information to a patient based on the information that a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances would want to know; in other words, there developed a duty to properly and adequately inform the patient. In addition, the Supreme Court brought in the concept of material risks.
Subsequently, an industry developed around privacy and confidentiality as well as informed consent. Many people, particularly lawyers, built large segments of their careers in providing advice in these arenas.
So what does all of this mean?
Our healthcare system is under siege. A day does not go by without media attention on the specific issues of waitlist problems or quality of care. In my former role as a member of the board of Health Quality Ontario, I observed the difficulty of establishing standards for quality and of implementing these in a climate of fiscal restraints. Although I have always been a strong advocate for individual rights (particularly in the healthcare arena), and the majority of legislation that I had a hand in creating reflects these efforts (particularly in the mental health field), both provincial and federal, one must examine whether anything really significant has been achieved.
Do consent forms properly reflect the understanding of patients? Such forms, either for the disclosure of information or to obtain various forms of specific treatments, have become quite complex. Ultimately, one must question whether a reasonable person in a patient's position can assimilate much of the information in these forms and understand the reasonably foreseeable consequences. This is particularly true when mental capacity, language and culture are factors. I am not suggesting that one must do away with or minimize the importance of consent. Documented actual conversations between providers and patients would be preferable. When staff and facilities hesitate for fear of legal consequences and when significant staff time is spent administering processes designed to defend facilities against allegations in the privacy and treatment arenas, there may be serious challenges to the ability to provide high-quality, efficient care. Staff and patient morale declines.
Accountability is always critical. Trust is largely based on the extent to which a system provides complete transparency. Can one not have openness and dialogue with patients rather than rely on mountains of forms? Most have abandoned the paternalism of the past. Substituting checklists and documents is hardly an improvement. Perhaps we need Horace Krever to undertake a third major review (blood being the second) to determine whether patients' interests are really being best served by current requirements. We all speak of an appropriate balance. Have we lost sight of what truly sits on each side of the scales?
